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India is one of the most socially fragmented and unequal societies of the world. At 
the same time, it has the distinction of having the longest history of most elaborative 
affirmative action programmes for alleviating socially structured inequalities. While 
the affirmative action programmes have wider coverage in terms of social groups, 
there is continuing demand by new social groups for getting acknowledged as 
‘disadvantaged’ and inclusion in the system of affirmative action. While group 
based ‘reservation’ as the most vital instrument of social justice has long been under 
fire and grappling with several challenges, the social justice regime is faced with the 
charge that it has largely excluded nation’s religious minorities. Of course, religion 
based affirmative action is faced with many constraints; nevertheless there are 
possibilities for it. This article discusses the constraints and possibilities of 
affirmative action for disadvantaged religious minorities, Muslims in particular. 
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India es una de las sociedades más fragmentadas y desiguales del mundo. Al mismo 
tiempo, cuenta con la particularidad de presentar la trayectoria más larga en la 
elaboración de programas de acción afirmativa orientados a hacer frente a las 
desigualdades estructurales. Mientras que los programas de acción afirmativa tienen 
una amplia cobertura en relación a los grupos sociales, existe una demanda 
constante por parte de nuevos grupos para conseguir el reconocimiento como 
“desfavorecido” y su inclusión en el sistema de acción afirmativa. Mientras que el 
sistema de cuotas como instrumento para promover la justicia social ha estado en el 
punto de mira y ha tenido que lidiar con diversos desafíos,  las políticas de justicia 
social se enfrentan a la acusación de que se ha excluido en gran medida a las 
minorías religiosas del país. Por supuesto, la acción afirmativa basada en la religión 
se enfrenta a muchos obstáculos; sin embargo, existen posibilidades para ello. Este 
artículo analiza las limitaciones y posibilidades de la acción afirmativa para 
minorías religiosas desfavorecidas, especialmente en el caso de las personas 
musulmanas.    
 _____________________________________________________________ 
Palabras clave: acción afirmativa, desigualdad, minoría, personas musulmanas, 
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ndia is one of the most socially fragmented and unequal societies of 
the world. At the same time, it has also had the distinction of having 
the most elaborated and longest running affirmative action 
programmes for alleviating structured inequalities (Galanter, 
1984).1 In order to achieve greater socio-economic equality for historically 
disadvantaged social groups such as the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the 
Scheduled Tribes (STs), there are fixed quotas for them (proportionate to 
their share in overall population) in educational institutions, public 
employment and political institutions (Parliament, State Legislative 
Assemblies and Local Bodies). In recent years, the system of reservation or 
quota has also been extended to Other Backward Classes (OBCs) whereby 
seats are reserved for them in public employment and institutions of higher 
education. However, there is continuing demand for reservation by new 
social groups. In many cases, the social groups struggling for reservation 
happen to be relatively prosperous and locally powerful.2 The continuing 
demand for and dispute over getting acknowledged as ‘disadvantaged’ have 
raised many questions with regard to conceptualization of disadvantage and 
the rationale, form, capacity and implications of the existing affirmative 
action programmes. While group based ‘reservation’ as the most vital 
instrument of social justice has long been under fire and grappling with 
several challenges, the social justice regime is faced with the charge that it 
has largely excluded nation’s minorities.  
As per the constitutional provisions religion based affirmative action is 
proscribed, although some religious minorities, if not all, have long been 
projecting them as disadvantaged and excluded, and, therefore, demanding 
for their inclusion in the affirmative action programmes. Nevertheless, the 
issue got renewed vigour following the findings and recommendations of the 
two commissions appointed by the Government of India - (a) The National 
Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities (NCRLM) constituted 
in 2004 under the chairmanship of Justice Ranganth Misra; and (b) Prime 
Minister’s High Level Committee to prepare ‘A Report on the Social, 
Economic and Educational Status of Muslim Community of India’ set up in 
2005 under the chairmanship of Justice Rajinder Sachar (henceforward 
Sachar Committee Report). While the former recommended for reservation 
I 
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for religious minorities as in the case SCs/STs/OBCs, the latter 
recommended for a range of affirmative measures (other than reservation) 
for disadvantaged religious minorities, Muslim minorities in particular.  
But the idea of affirmative action for Muslims or for that matter any other 
religious group as a ‘disadvantaged group’ is beset with many fundamental 
challenges. These include but are not limited to: (a) legal/constitutional 
barriers to religion based affirmative action3; (b) complex intra – group 
differentiation and inequality; (c) finding a convincing way of measuring 
disadvantage in its all complexity; and (d) minimizing the impact of 
unintended policy consequences (social and political turmoil). Nevertheless, 
given the pathetic average socioeconomic conditions of the community, 
there is a compelling need for state intervention so as to enable them to have 
greater access to and participation in those opportunities availed by majority 
of people (Alam, 2010; 2014).  
Against this backdrop the aim of this paper is threefold:  (a) to understand 
the sociopolitical processes underlying affirmative action for religious 
minorities; (b) to interrogate various strands of debate on affirmative action 
for Muslims, and (b) to propose and critically examine various policy 
alternatives in order to enrich the ongoing debates and churning on 
affirmative action for Muslims.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section 
briefly discusses as to constitutional position on minorities and how they are 
educationally and economically placed. Section 3 presents the contours of 
affirmative action debate on religious minorities. Section 4 discusses various 
models through which Muslim minorities may be benefited from existing 
affirmative action programmes. Section 5 concludes the discussion.  
 
India’s National Minorities 
In India, the word ‘minority’ is quite loosely defined and continues to be 
debated. The Constitution speaks of religious and linguistic minorities. 
Article 30 of the Constitution speaks specifically about two categories of 
minorities – religious and linguistic. Religious communities, which are 
culturally distinct and numerically smaller than the Hindus at national level, 
are designated as a ‘minority’. Seen thus, religious groups such as Muslims, 
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Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists and Parsis are recognized as national 
minorities.4  
Although there is a legal/constitutional framework for protection of 
minority rights, some minority groups, if not all, are found to face severe 
socioeconomic disadvantages for various reasons. For example, religious 
minorities such as Parsis, Christians, Sikhs and Jains are much better on  a 
variety of indicators of human development than the national average or 
Hindus (the majority community) taken as a whole. Thus, minority status per 
se is not linked to socioeconomic disadvantage and deprivation. However, 
the Muslims, the largest religious minority group (constituting about 14 
percent of total population), have fallen behind others in the crucial sectors 
of life (Sachar, 2006; Alam, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Shariff & Basant, 2010). 
And, therefore, the debate on affirmative action for minorities in the current 
context is largely confined to the Muslim community.  
 
Debating Affirmative Action for Minorities 
During the colonial rule, religious minorities enjoyed benefits of affirmative 
action in various spheres (Wright, 1997). After the colonial power gone, 
these privileges given to minorities were done away with. The Constitution 
of India did not provide for affirmative measures for religious minorities as 
it did for formerly ‘depressed classes’. Nonetheless, the issue was intensely 
debated in the Constituent Assembly. In the Constituent Assembly Debates 
(CAD) meetings held between December 1946 and August 1947 reservation 
was seen as a possible solution to allay fears and apprehensions of minorities 
(Hasan, 2009; Tejani, 2013). For instance, the sub-committee on minority 
rights in its report (submitted to the Advisory Committee on Fundamental 
Rights on the 27th July 1947) had recommended for reservation for religious 
minorities such as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs in legislatures on the basis 
of joint electorates and in public employment in proportion to their share in 
overall population.5 Accordingly, the Advisory Committee on Fundamental 
Rights recommended that seats for different recognized minorities as a rule 
would be reserved. However, the issue reopened following the report of a 
special sub-committee that had met in December 1948.6  The report held that 
the situation in the country (following the Partition) had changed to such an 
extent that ‘it was no longer appropriate in the context of Free India and of 
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present conditions that there should be reservation of seats for Muslims, 
Christians and Sikhs or any other religious community’. It further held that 
reservation for religious communities ‘did lead to a certain degree of 
separatism’.7 As a matter of fact, majority of members belonging to 
minorities held that political safeguards would not serve the interest for 
minorities. Thus, acting upon the report of the special sub-committee, the 
Advisory Committee overwhelmingly voted for the abolition of political 
safeguards for religious minorities.  
The reservation for religious minorities in services reopened for 
discussion in the CA on the 14th October 1949. Moving amendment (No. 
3163 of the list of amendments) for Article 296,8 B.R Ambedkar proposed 
that ‘[t]he claims of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
shall be taken into consideration consistently with the maintenance of 
efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and 
posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State’.9 Many 
members including Sardar Hukum Singh, Bhopindra Singh Mann and 
Naziruddin Ahmad (all belonging to religious minority communities) 
pointed out that the present resolution was reversal of earlier decision. 
Sardar Hukum Singh argued that it was nowhere suggested that all 
safeguards would go.  The only decision that was agreed to was: “That the 
system of reservation for minorities other than Scheduled Castes in 
legislatures be abolished”. Naziruddin Ahmed submitted:  
 
 “It is absolutely clear on a perusal of the original report, the letter of 
Sardar Patel, the resolution moved by him and in the speeches in the 
Houses – that they all attempted reconsideration only of the reservation 
for minorities in the Legislatures. I may add that this was done with the 
fullest concurrence of the Muslim members of this House. I was one of 
those who thought that the reservation in Legislatures would not be good 
for minorities themselves; but with regard to consideration of their cases 
in making appointments, subject to efficiency was not reopened’.10 
 
Sardar Hukum Singh made a powerful plea for restoring the original 
proposal that was already accepted by the House. He proposed that article 
296 be substituted to read: “Subject to the provision of the next succeeding 
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article the claims of all minority communities shall be taken into 
consideration, consistently with the maintenance of administration, in the 
making appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of 
the Union or of a State for the time being specified in Part I of the First 
Schedule.” When put to vote, his amendment was rejected by the House and 
that of Ambedkar voted to become part of the constitution. With this, 
reservation for minorities was wholly rolled back.  
What explains change of mind of the members of constituent assembly? 
It is suggested that it was largely the partition and consequent communal 
violence that served a major blow on the scope of reservation for religious 
minorities. First, the Partition marked departure of 55 Muslims, leaving 
behind only 28 members in the constituent assembly. With this, the 
bargaining power of the members of the minority communities in the 
constituent assembly got diluted substantially. Secondly, the changed 
circumstances forced the members of minority communities to demonstrate 
their loyalty to India. As Wright Jr. (1997, p. 853) puts it: ‘neither were 
Hindu representatives willing to continue this concession nor were the 
remaining Muslim committee members prepared to press for it’. Now on, the 
minority rights got increasingly framed under “secularism” and 
“undifferentiated citizenship” rather than “social justice”. Many members of 
constituent assembly argued that in secular India political safeguard along 
religious lines would be antithetical to the ideals of secularism. For example, 
Krishnaswamy Bharti from Madras argued that “community should not be 
made the basis of civic right. In a secular State right to representation is only 
the right to represent a territory in which all communities live”.11  Other 
members namely Mahabir Tyagi also made similar points. In the given 
political circumstances, not only did these voices have wider appeal in the 
assembly, they were difficult to be countered.   
A fresh opportunity for minorities to get included into the reservation 
system arose when the first Backward Classes Commission was set up in 
1953 to identify ‘backward classes’ and widen the coverage of affirmative 
progrommes. The commission received representations from religious 
organizations. In their representations, Muslim organizations demanded that 
the Muslim community as a whole should be treated as backward. While the 
commission did not treat religious communities (minority religions) as a 
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whole as a backward class, it recognized some groups/sub-groups among 
them as ‘backward classes’.12 Like its predecessor, the second Backward 
Classes Commission constituted in 1979 (popularly known as Mandal 
Commission after its chairman B.P Mandal) also did not recognize religious 
groups as a whole as ‘backward class’. Rather, it identified some groups 
among non-Hindus as socially and educationally backward classes based on 
the two criteria: (a) all untouchables converted to non-Hindu religions; and 
(b) such occupational communities which are known by the name of their 
traditional hereditary occupation and whose Hindu counterparts have been 
included in the list Hindu OBCs. Though the criteria for identifying OBCs 
among non-Hindus were short of careful thought and beset with 
methodological fallacies, the fact remains that a section of Muslims became 
part of the reservation system.   
The inclusion of some groups/sub-groups, however, did not satisfy the 
community elites. The demands for reservation for the entire community 
continued.  In 1994, the Association for Promoting Education and 
Employment of Muslims (APEEM) convened a conference in New Delhi. 
This conference was of immense importance because the then Minister of 
Welfare in the Union Cabinet, Sitaram Keshri, not only attended the 
conference but also advocated separate quota for Muslims in educational 
institutions and public employment. This implied that the Conference had 
been convened with the tacit support of the Congress (Wright, 1997). The 
APEEM has continued to buttress demands of reservation for Muslims in its 
successive conferences (Alam, 2009a, 2009b).  
The idea of affirmative action for Muslims received wider attention 
following the reports of the two commissions set up by the UPA (United 
Progressive Alliance) government in 2004. The Prime minister’s High 
Power Panel, popularly known as Sachar Committee, analyzed 
socioeconomic status of the Muslim community vis-à-vis others. 13 Based on 
its findings on certain indicators of educational and economic attainment 
social groups can be vertically arranged as follows: forward caste Hindus at 
the top, followed by Hindu OBCs as well as upper caste/class Muslims; 
distantly followed by SCs/STs, and the Muslim OBCs being at the bottom. 
While the primary mandate of the Sachar Committee was to map the levels 
of deprivation among Muslims and diagnose the problem, it also highlighted 
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the areas of intervention and suggested multifarious measures (minus 
reservation) to overcome various kinds of deprivations among Muslims.  
The ‘National Commission on Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ 
(NCRLM) appointed around the same time was, however, primarily 
mandated to find out solutions to socioeconomic problems facing the 
Muslim community. Its mandate included: (a) suggest criteria for 
identification of socially and economically backward sections among 
religious and linguistic minorities; (b) recommend measures for welfare of 
socially and economically backward sections among religious and linguistic 
minorities, including reservation in education and government employment; 
and (c) to suggest the necessary constitutional, legal and administrative 
modalities required for the implementation of its recommendations. 
Accordingly, the NCRLM in its report (2007) recommended reservation for 
Muslims. We will discuss its proposals with regard to reservation for 
minorities in greater detail in the following section; suffice here to say that it 
gave some legitimacy to the demands of reservation for Muslims.  
 
Alternative Models of Affirmative Action for Minorities: Constraints 
and Possibilities 
 
In India, much of the discourse on affirmative action is focussed on 
reservation. Nevertheless, there are many important ways through which 
group based disadvantages can be substantively redressed. In fact, many of 
them appear to be more capable of combating group based disadvantages 
than reservation.  In what follows is a critical discussion on a wide array of 
approaches or models that might contribute to or could be useful in thinking 
about social equity for disadvantaged minorities such as Muslims.  
 
Quota Approach 
It is probably the most popular as well as contentious form of affirmative 
action. The popularity of quota or reservation lies in the fact that it is an 
outcome oriented policy approach, for it involves fixed amount of budgetary 
allocation and/or a fixed proportion of seats in educational institutions and 
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public employment reserved for the disadvantaged group. This form of 
affirmative action is particularly effective in the societies that are deeply 
divided along religious, ethnic or linguistic axes and characterized by deep 
institutional and structural barriers to social equality. Since a quota for the 
disadvantaged group in question is “fixed”, it helps disadvantaged groups 
overcome prejudices against them in the system of distributive benefits and 
the wider society as well.  
The most distinctive aspect of affirmative action in India is fixed quota 
for the target groups - the Scheduled Castes (SCs), the Scheduled Tribes 
(STs) and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). As far as inclusion of 
Muslims in the reservation policy is concerned, some sub-groups among 
them are identified as OBCs. However, it is often claimed that Muslims have 
not received a fair deal in the reservation policy. While there is a demand for 
a fixed quota for the entire Muslim community, it has several strands. There 
are many who argue that relative backwardness of Muslims is more a matter 
of inter-group diversity than intra-group disparity, for Muslims as a whole 
are victim of invidious discrimination that has pushed them to the level of 
SCs/STs. (Akhtar & Ahmad 2003; Hasan, 2005). The nub of these 
arguments is that the identity based biases run so deep in the system that not 
only are affirmative actions necessary, but no affirmative action policy other 
than ‘fixed quota’ is ever likely to work.   
Such arguments have, however, come under attack from within the 
community itself. Some sections of Muslims argue that class and caste 
categories should be retained while considering Muslims for affirmative 
action (Engineer, 2004). It is argued that like Hindus, Muslims are also 
characterised by internal differentiations in terms of caste-like groupings. 
Though Islam prohibits caste and class distinctions among Muslims, in 
practice the Muslim community is not immune from caste-like hierarchies 
(Ahmad, 1978; Karanath, 2007). More recent converts, the majority of 
whom were lower caste Hindus, are not seen as socio-economic equals 
within the community (Ali, 2001; Mondal, 2003). This implies that all 
Muslims are not backward, nor do all of them require affirmative action. The 
basis of affirmative action in the form of reservation for Muslims should, 
therefore, be linked to social and economic stratification within the 
community. The underlying assumption is that the benefits of reservation 
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should go to those within the Muslim community whose social and 
economic status is no different from Hindu lower castes. Extending benefits 
of reservation to the entire community would only benefit the upper crust of 
the community who can advance in life on their own, while those who really 
need reservations would be left untouched. Hence, it will defeat the avowed 
purpose of the policy aimed at uplifting the deprived sections within the 
community. This argument is particularly advanced by the Pasmanda 
(backward) Muslims Organizations (Jenkins, 2003). 
The official proposal for extending reservation to the entire Muslim 
community is put forward by the NCLRM (2007). There are basically two 
proposals.  One, the entire Muslim community may be declared ‘backward’ 
within the meaning of that term in Article 16 (4) of the Constitution - 
notably without qualifying the word ‘backward’ with the words ‘socially’ 
and ‘educationally’ and that reservation could be given over and above 
existing 49.5 percent. The commission suggested 15 percent reservation for 
minorities, subdivided into 10 percent for Muslims and 5 percent for other 
minorities.  The second proposal is, in fact, placed as an alternative in case 
there is any difficulty in implementing the first proposal. According to this 
proposal, subject to minor adjustment inter se in accordance with population 
of various minorities in various states/UTs, a sub quota of 8.4 for minorities 
(internally sub-divided into 6 percent for Muslims and 2.4 percent for other 
minorities) within the 27 percent OBC quota should be carved out on the 
ground that minorities account for 8.4 percent of the total OBC population.14 
However, both the proposals appear to be faced with legal/constitutional 
problems. As far as the first proposal is concerned, recognising the entire 
Muslim community as ‘backward’ for the purpose of reservation involves 
amendments in the constitution for (a) extending reservation to Muslims as a 
backward class’ and (b) removing the ceiling of 50 percent.15 On the second 
proposal, it has been argued that the inclusion of groups in the category of 
OBC is based on the twin criteria of ‘social’ and ‘educational’ 
backwardness. As stated earlier, since Indian Muslims comprise of multitude 
of sub-groups and many of them are of high social origin, the idea of 
inclusion of the entire Muslim community is not in the fitness of 
constitutional provisions.  
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One may, of course, argue that if objective position of Muslims as a 
whole is no different from officially recognized backward classes, the 
constitution should be amended to recognize them as ‘backward classes. 
After all, the constitution has been amended for similar purposes on many 
occasions. For example, it has been amended to grant the status of the 
Scheduled Caste to members of Sikh and Buddhist communities in 1956 and 
1990 respectively. On the face of it, this argument has some merits. 
However, arguments such as these should not be made in isolation from 
larger social and political consequences. For one, if past experience is any 
guide, reservation has been an overly emotive and divisive issue. Attempts 
of increasing the quantum of reservation have met with violent resistance 
and political backlash (Kumar, 1992; Shah, 1991; Weiner, 1983). The 
extension of reservation to Muslims would not only be opposed at political 
and societal levels,16 the reactions would be even more violent than in the 
case of OBCs. In other words, pressing for reservation for the entire Muslim 
community in the current socio-political clime may further isolate the 
community from the wider society.  Secondly, as we have noted, the 
opposition to the idea of reservation for the entire Muslim community is also 
likely to come from within the community itself. In other words, considering 
all Muslims for reservation may also create many problems within the 
community itself.  
In view of above complexities a pertinent question that arises: is there 
any scope under the existing legal/constitutional framework and political 
conditions to maximize the benefits of reservation for eligible Muslims?  
There are two issues to be looked into in this regard. It is often claimed (a) 
that the method used by the Mandal Commission to identify OBCs among 
Muslims is flawed, leaving many genuinely deserving sub-groups among 
Muslims out of the OBC category; (b) that Muslim OBCs are far more 
disadvantaged than their counterpart among Hindus and as a result the 
former are unable to compete with the latter and thus much less likely to 
benefit from reservation earmarked for OBCs as a whole.  
Let us take up the first claim first. As per the NSSO (68th round) 
estimates, Muslim OBCs account for 7 percent of total population. In other 
words, half the Muslims (13.4 percent of total population) are placed in the 
OBC category. However, sociologists and anthropologists have suggested 
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that about 80-90 percent of Muslims are descendents of converts who 
belonged to ‘untouchables’ and lower caste Hindus (Mondal, 2003). It thus 
points to the fact that the Muslim communities who are socially and 
educationally backward like their counterparts following other religions 
have not been properly identified. To put slightly differently, there is scope 
for identifying many more Muslim communities as socially and 
educationally backward classes and place them in the OBC list. Of late, this 
exercise has been done in a number of states including West Bengal and 
Andhra Pradesh. It has not faced hurdles of any sort – legal or political. In 
brief, identification and inclusion of more Muslim communities in both 
central and state lists of OBCs is possible without any fetters. If 
identification problem is overcome it will substantially increase Muslims’ 
share in the reservation policy. 
With regard to the claim of not being able to appropriate benefits of 
reservation, it is not the Muslim OBCs who are particularly faced with this 
problem. As a matter of fact, a large number of communities have 
complained that they are unable to compete with relatively advanced 
communities within the OBCs, and therefore not benefiting from the 
reservation regime. Acting upon such complaints, many states have created 
sub-quotas within the 27 per cent quota. This also includes a sub-quota for 
OBC Muslims. For example, Kerala has divided OBC into eight categories 
and accordingly has eight sub-quotas. There is one sub-quota for Muslim 
OBCs. Similarly, Karnataka has a sub-quota of 4 per cent for Muslim OBCs. 
Recently, Andhra Pradesh has added the category ‘E’ in the existing fourfold 
classification of OBCs to devise a sub-quota of 4 per cent for Muslim OBCs 
(Krishnan 2012). Such classifications and sub-quotas have stood judicial 
scrutiny. Nor have they been subjected to political controversies. In brief, 
sub-quotas for most backward communities including Muslims (OBCs) are 
legally appropriate, judicially sustainable and politically non- contentious. 
Thus, if a comprehensive system for sub-quotas based on differential levels 
of backwardness/deprivation at the central and state level (where sub-quotas 
are not available) is done, it will benefit the most backward communities 
including Muslims identified as OBCs.   
 
 





The spatial approach is rather a process oriented policy. It is most suited in 
the context where ethnicity based deprivation is coterminous with 
backwardness of region. Nigeria offers the best example of this model of 
affirmative action. This approach envisages undertaking of various 
ameliorative schemes for the development of the backward region, leading 
to betterment of the local communities inhabiting the given region. A 
distinctive feature of this approach is that spatiality masks both ethnicity and 
class as the basis of selection of beneficiaries, a major critique of the ‘quota’ 
approach. As the coverage of this form of affirmative action is broad based, 
programmes undertaken are socially and politically least contentious. 
However, such an approach may not yield desired or desirable results for 
various reasons. For one, disadvantaged groups are often poor in human and 
social capital. In such events, developmental initiatives may bypass the 
intended beneficiaries even in areas where they are in greater numbers. 
Second, biased bureaucracy or policy implementing agencies may distribute 
funds or tailor schemes in such a manner that ends up benefiting the well off 
groups/individuals.       
How far does this approach suit affirmative action for Muslim 
minorities? In order to be able to answer this question, we need first of all to 
look at spatial demography of Muslims. In 2001, Muslims with a population 
of 138 millions accounted for about 13.4 percent of total population in the 
country (Census of India 2001). Unlike other minority communities, 
Muslims are unevenly distributed across the length and breadth of the 
country. At the national level, the proportion of Muslims varies from 66.9 
percent in Jammu and Kashmir and 30.9 percent in Assam to 5.5 percent in 
Tamil Nadu. Of the total Muslim population in the country, over half (53 
percent) lives in just four states namely Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and 
West Bengal. The southern four states – Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu – together account for one-sixth of total Muslim population 
in the country. At the sub-national level, while there is hardly a district that 
does not have Muslim population, there are 20 districts (out of 594 districts 
in 2001) across states where Muslims form the majority community. There 
are another 38 districts that have substantial Muslim population, accounting 
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for over a quarter of total population but below 50 percent. The spatial 
distribution of Muslims does suggest that there are some clusters of Muslims 
and therefore spatial approach may be applicable as well as useful in 
designing affirmative action for Muslims. Let us now take a brief look at 
different aspects of spatial approach including coverage, efficacy and 
quantum of benefits.  
In India, the spatial approach in the context of religious minorities has 
been in existence since 1987. Partly as a follow up to the Gopal Singh 
Committee Report, the Government of India prepared a list of 41 minority 
concentration districts (having 20 per cent or more population of minorities 
in a district based on 1971 census) for focused attention of the government 
to implement developmental and welfare schemes. In 2008-09, the 
Government of India revamped this approach to launch area development 
initiatives, also known as ‘multi-sectoral development programme’ (MsDP). 
This programme was launched in 90 minority concentrated districts (MCD) 
(based on 25 percent or more minority population as per 2001 census). 
However, the MsDP progrommes came under attack for several reasons such 
as inadequate coverage, flawed design and poor implementation. .  
In terms of coverage, MCDs contained only 37 percent of minority 
population. As far as Muslims are concerned, they accounted for 30 percent 
of total population in the MCDs and 40 percent of total Muslim population 
the country. Thus, majority of Muslims lived outside the MCDs, and 
therefore left out of the MsDP programme.  The MsDP also had serious 
design, content and implementation problems. It was designed as an 
umbrella programme to intensify developmental activities in the MCDs.  
Since the district was made unit of planning, funding and implementation in 
absence of clear guidance as to where in the districts the projects were to be 
carried out, the schemes ended up benefiting non-minority population. On 
content, the schemes launched under MsDP were not only very few but also 
did not promise far reaching changes in the lives of minorities. For instance, 
these schemes basically related to housing (Indira Awas Yojna), 
construction of primary schools, more specifically construction of additional 
classrooms, skill development initiatives etc. Again, in absence of clear 
guidelines on selection of activities, bulk of spending was reported to have 
been directed towards construction of houses (Khan & Parvati, 2013).  
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Realizing that district is too big a unit for planning, the government has 
now switched to sub-district as a unit of planning, funding and 
implementation of projects. A total of 710 minority concentration blocks 
(with 25 percent or more minority population) in 155 backward districts 
have been identified. Moreover, in selected sub-districts (blocks), as the new 
guidelines suggest, the villages having higher minority population would be 
given priority for creation of village level infrastructure/assets. With this, 
part of the coverage problem seems to have been addressed. Over 60 percent 
of Muslim population is now covered by minority concentrated blocks 
(MCBs).  
However, the problems with regard to content and implementation 
remain. To make this approach contributing significantly to address 
developmental deficits in minority concentrated areas, there is a need to 
enlarge the bouquet of schemes and remove the institutional bottlenecks. On 
the front of education, for example, the focus should shift from construction 
of primary and upper primary schools to construction of secondary schools, 
colleges and technical institutes (other than ITIs). In each of the identified 
block schools matching the quality of Kendriya or Navodaya Vidyalay need 
to be opened up. On the economic front, funds exclusively for up-scaling 
home based enterprises may be made available on easy terms and 
conditions. There should also be focus on creating durable assets and 
sustainable employment opportunities. The list is too long to be presented 
here.  
However, no amount of well intentioned schemes/programme can achieve 
anything unless they get implemented on the ground in true spirit of the 
schemes; and policies cannot get implemented unless the structures of 
implementation are simplified.  Currently, the schemes launched under area 
initiative programme are jointly funded by the central and state 
governments. At a given point of time, different states have different parties 
in power which are differentially sensitive to the issues facing the minority 
communities and therefore policies aimed at benefiting minorities can be 
differentially successful across states.17 Moreover, there are multiple layers 
of planning and approval of activities. This offers ample scope to 
bureaucracy for delaying approval and implementing projects. In other 
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words, this approach to affirmative action despite having huge potentials 
may prove a damp squib.  
In sum, if carefully designed and effectively implemented, the spatial 
approach can greatly help address developmental deficits among Muslims 
along with others living in backward or under developed areas/regions.    
 
Sectoral Approach 
The sectoral approach involves identification of sectors for state intervention 
which may largely benefit the disadvantaged/targeted groups. Like spatial 
approach, the basis of selection of intended beneficiaries is not ‘group’ based 
on ascriptive characteristics, for its explicit aim is to bail out the entire sector 
identified for government intervention. And yet, this approach can be used to 
benefit individuals without making explicit reference to their ethnic or 
religious identity. An ideal context in which sectoral approach can be useful 
is the one where the disadvantaged group in question displays higher 
concentration in the given sectors of economy or occupations.   
A major advantage of sectoral approach is that it is inclusive by design 
and thus not prone to legal and political controversies. For example, if a 
particular kind of enterprise is chosen for investment or for weeding out 
problems facing it, the entire sector gets benefitted. Although it is possible 
that a particular social group has disproportionate presence in that enterprise, 
it does not have exclusive claims on the benefits out of state intervention. 
Hence, such policies enjoy greater acceptance.   
As far as application of this approach for addressing disadvantages faced 
by Muslims is concerned, it sounds great as a large number of Muslims are 
artisans and run home based enterprises. There are certain enterprises or 
occupation in which Muslim workers are disproportionately engaged. These 
enterprises include carpentry, butchery, weaving, lock and brass making, 
carpet and perfume making, leather work etc. Many of these enterprises face 
the problems of raw materials, financial capital, spatial segregation, lack of 
availability of appropriate modern technology and exploitation by big traders 
and so on. The onset of globalization and liberalization accompanied by 
unbridled powers of traders has further worsened the conditions of those 
employed in these occupations (Harris-White, 2003; Ahmad, 2013; Jamil, 
2014). Thus, a policy package that provides for up-scaling and modernizing 
HSE – Social and Education History, 5(3) 263 
 
 
small scale enterprises by making capital available; up-skilling manpower 
(to use technology) by providing training; putting in place a mechanism to 
do away with exploitation by traders and so on may help a large number of 
Muslims and may have multiplier positive effects on their lives.  
In India, sector based schemes have been in existence for some time. For 
instance, the Ministry of Cotton Textile has launched a number of schemes 
for handloom and handicraft sector. The handloom sector alone employs 
over 65 lakh persons.18 The government has identified about 470 handloom 
clusters for development of the handloom sector. In 2008-09, 
Comprehensive Handloom Sector Development Scheme was introduced by 
the Ministry of Cotton Textile for development of two Mega Handloom 
Clusters – Varansi (Uttar Pradesh) and Sivsagar (Assam). There are also 
schemes for other small scale enterprises launched by Ministry of Small 
Scale Industries.  
On the face of it, sectoral approach may greatly help members of the 
Muslim community as the size of artisan class among them is 
disproportionately large. However, there are no studies to show how 
different schemes for traditional and marginal occupations work and impact 
the lives of those engaged in such occupations on the ground. Since most of 
such schemes are financed and implemented within the federal framework, 
that is, both central and state governments being responsible for financing, 
the efficacy of such schemes is likely to be variable across states depending 
on commitment of the state governments towards the welfare of people 
engaged in marginal occupations. Also, it is possible that the targeted groups 
may be used as the front but benefits of government schemes are actually 
cornered by others. In Malysia, this kind of arrangement is known as ‘Ali-
Baba’ enterprises (Sowell, 2004). In this case, Ali is someone who belongs 
to the targeted groups (the native Bhumiputras) and in whose name the 
enterprise/firm is registered. But actual control of the firm/enterprise is in 
the hand of ‘Baba’ who is someone outside the targeted group.   
  
Anti- Discrimination Structures 
In multi-ethnic/multicultural societies, the minority groups based on 
ethnicity, region, religion, language, national origin etc., tend to have 
feelings of being discriminated against by the state agencies as well as the 
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wider society. They often attribute their deprivations to invidious 
discrimination practised against them. In order to address the problem of 
discrimination - actual or perceived - many democratic and multi-ethnic 
countries - the United States of America, Canada, United Kingdom, Brazil, 
South Africa to name a few - have enacted anti-discrimination laws and 
created anti-discrimination or equal opportunity authorities. For example, 
the United States of America passed Equal Opportunity Act in 1972 and 
created Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to prohibit 
discrimination in employment and workplace. In 2010, the United Kingdom 
(UK) passed Equality Act 2010 to replace all previous anti-discrimination 
laws with a single Act. The Act aims to prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, marital status and age. Without 
giving the whole list of countries with equal opportunity structures, suffice it 
to say that such measures are in existence and have proved useful to combat 
discrimination and problems of under- representation of disadvantaged 
groups in critical sectors of life such as employment and educational 
institutions. As Borooah (2010, p. 33) puts it, ‘not only do EO policies 
attempt to eliminate discrimination bias by making it illegal, EO builds non-
discriminatory policies into the fabric of the human resource management of 
organizations...’. These efforts are said to have made substantial impact on 
the lives of the minority groups often prone to discrimination (Khaitan, 
2008).  
India is a multi-ethnic and multicultural country. As a matter of fact, 
almost all social groups, big or small, perceive themselves as potential 
victims of illegitimate discrimination. However, such feelings are more 
pervasive among historically marginalized groups and religious minorities. 
Whether or not a group is actually discriminated against, the feeling of 
discriminatory treatment itself causes a lot of damages. To illustrate, if a 
social group is gripped by the perception that its members are not going to 
get good jobs despite having appropriate qualification because of biased 
labour market, it may not invest in education and apply for jobs available in 
the labour market. In economic literature, this is called ‘discouragement 
effect’. In brief, this traps the social group having perception of being 
discriminated against into the vicious cycle of lower investment in human 
capital (because education may not be seen as a passport to public 
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employment), under-skilled manpower, lower level of economic mobility 
(because of lack of education), and lower level of income (because of being 
positioned at lower rungs of economic structures), and lower investment in 
human capital (because of lower income). It is thus absolutely necessary to 
create equal opportunity structures armed with statutory powers to deal with 
complaints of discrimination in a fixed time frame.  
The first attempt towards creating Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) 
was initiated by the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government as a 
follow up to the recommendations of Sachar Committee (2005). The 
government appointed an Expert Group in 2008 to ‘examine and determine 
the structure of an Equal Opportunity Commission’. Underlining the 
importance of Equal Opportunity Commission, the expert group observed: 
“Perhaps equal opportunity situations would have been different had the 
Government set up Equal Opportunity Commission immediately after the 
enactment of the Constitution”.19   
Given that EOCs in other countries have been very effective in weeding 
out discrimination in hiring processes and in distribution of state resources, 
this is not an exaggerated statement. The Commission envisaged an EOC 
that would be ‘autonomous of the government of the day and be capable of 
responding quickly and effectively to any challenge it is faced with’; would 
entail multifarious functions – advisory/consultative, policy intervention, 
investigative and grievance redressal; would cover disadvantaged groups 
based on an open ended list of irrelevant personal characteristics; and would 
have jurisdiction over both public and private sectors. This makes the design 
of EOC not only morally better but also promises to positively affect the 
lives of disadvantaged groups/individuals far more than any other welfare 
measures can for the following reasons. First, since the principal reason for 
under-representation of disadvantaged groups including Muslims in various 
structures of opportunities is seen to lie in systemic discrimination against 
them, an effective EOC will not only help them redress their grievances 
sooner than later, it may instil confidence among them and thereby dilute the 
tendency (among disadvantaged groups/individuals) of withdrawing from 
competition for positions. Second, the jurisdiction of EOC is not just limited 
to jobs and educational institutions and that too in the public sector as in the 
case of reservation, but may also extend to unfair treatment in private sectors 
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and a wide variety of other areas such as housing, institutional credit lending 
and so on. In other words, anti-discrimination measures including EOC can 
bring about far reaching changes in the lives of far more people across 
groups than reservation does or can.    
Nevertheless, constitution of EOC like bodies is faced with two major, 
though not insurmountable, difficulties. One, there are many commissions 
dealing with issues of different groups with some functions similar to those 
proposed for EOC. In other words, there is scope of overlapping spheres of 
mandate and jurisdictions between EOC and other commissions or statutory 
bodies like Commissions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
Women’s Commissions, Minority Commissions and so on. One way out of 
this impasse is to merge different bodies/structures/commissions into a 
single Equal Opportunity Commission or to take out some powers/functions 
(relevant to EOC) of different commissions and assign them to EOC. But 
this is not an easy task to do. This is precisely the reason why the EOC Bill 
could not be introduced in the Parliament. There were differences of 
opinions within the government. One argument was that since EOC as 
proposed by the Expert Group would stand in conflict with other existing 
statutory commissions, it should cover religious minorities only. Others 
argued that EOC for minorities only would render it meaningless. It will be 
seen as another instrument of minority appeasement. Second, even an 
effectively functioning EOC may end up dealing with limited number of 
complaints. Given the pervasiveness of discriminatory feelings across social 
groups, the EOC will be flooded with the complaints of discrimination 
which in turn may seriously impair its ability to dispose of the cases in the 
given time frame. In such a situation, to have an EOC may mean like any 
other commissions that hardly serve the purpose for which they were 
created.  
In sum, given the pervasiveness of discrimination the EOC can be an 
effective instrument of addressing social inequities, provided that it is 
designed in much better ways than the one proposed by the government, that 








India is one of most unequal societies of the world. Inequalities are 
manifested in terms of caste, tribe, gender, religion and region and so on. 
These axes of inequalities are, however, not mutually exclusive. They tend 
to get nested in complex ways. Nonetheless, religion is a major axis of 
persistent inequalities. Given that the Muslim communities are faced with 
several forms of disadvantages relative to other socio-religious communities, 
and that India has the most elaborated affirmative action programmes for 
disadvantaged groups, there is a strong case of affirmative action for 
Muslims. However, designing affirmative action for Muslims or for that 
matter any other disadvantaged minority group should be based on sound 
reason and criteria to convey right messages to the beneficiary group as well 
as the wider society. So, affirmative action policy for Muslims needs to 
factor in the followings: (a) that the nature and degrees of disadvantages 
facing Muslims vary across space and also in terms of social origin, that is, 
their relative backwardness is multi-layered; (b) that the existing 
constitutional provisions put some limitations to adoption of affirmative 
measures for Muslims similar to other disadvantage groups; and (c) the 
political class is sharply divided on different forms of affirmative action, if 
not on the idea of ‘affirmative action’ for minorities per se. It thus suggests 
that a single set of measures will be inadequate to remove complex and 
multi-layered disadvantages facing the Muslims. To put slightly differently, 
there is a need is to follow what may be called a “mixed approach” or a 
“multilateral approach”. For example, at one level initiatives may be taken to 
proper identification of backward classes among Muslims. At another level, 
spatial and sectoral approaches either combined or separately can be better 
designed and implemented to benefit Muslims along with other deprived 
groups to tackle developmental deficits thereof. At the other level, anti-
discrimination measures such as EOC may be put in place. Taken together, 
these measures can be reasonably expected not only to help addressing 
grievances of Muslims and other marginalized groups but also to bring about 
substantive transformation in their lives. 
 





1 Affirmative action is a nebulous term used to refer to deliberate undertaking of positive steps 
or policies aimed to make progress towards achieving substantive rather than formal equality 
of opportunity for those groups currently underrepresented in crucial sectors of life and/or in 
significant positions in the structures of opportunities (Mullen 1988; Brest and Oshige, 1995). 
In India, policies that can be described as affirmative action were introduced by the British 
regime in the very beginning of the 20th century for religious minorities and depressed 
classes. In the first quarter of the 20th century, middle castes were given benefits of 
reservation in public employment in the Madras Presidency and some of the independently 
ruled areas of southern and western India.   
2 For instance, the Jats, the Marathas and the Patels are land owning and relatively prosperous 
communities and yet demanding for reservation. Out of political expediency, the state 
governments carved out quotas for them but such quotas could not stand judicial scrutiny and 
were summarily struck down by the courts. On the other hand, the Gujjars, traditionally a 
pastoral community of north and central India, have been agitating for some time to be 
included in the list of STs. They claim that they are tribes and have wrongly been placed in 
the list of OBCs.  
3 For example, the Andhra Pradesh Government introduced a quota of 5 per cent for Muslims 
in educational institutions as well as public employment for Muslims. It was challenged in the 
court and eventually the Andhra Pradesh High court struck it down.  
4 Also see National Commission for Minorities Act 1992; Report of the National Commission 
for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India, 
2007.  
5 Also see CAD (26 May 1949:321). 
6 The members of the sub-committee comprised J.L Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, K.M Munshi 
and B.R Ambedkar and Sardar Patel. Sardar Patel, on 11 May 1949, laid down the report of 
this sub-committee before the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights. 
7 On this see, CAD, Vol. VIII, 25 May 1949: 311, Appendix A 
8 Article 296 in the Draft Constitution originally contained: “In the all India and provincial 
services the claims of all minorities shall be kept in view in making appointments to these 
services consistently with the consideration of efficiency in administration”.   
9  CAD, Vol. X, 14 October 1949, p. 229 
10 CAD, Vol. X, 14 October 1949, p. 229 
11 See CAD, Vol. VII, 8 November 1948, p.323.    
12 The First Backward Classes Commission (1953-55) held that “it would be not fair or just to 
list all Muslims as socially and educationally backward. Officially, Muslims do not recognize 
any caste. It must be said to the credit of Islam it did not compromise its position in the matter 
of untouchables. There are certain professions, however, that are regarded as inferior even by 
the Muslims. The sense of high and low has gradually permeated Muslim society and there 
are a number of communities amongst them that are suffering from social inferiority and 
consequent educational backwardness. We have recognized this deterioration that has 
overcome Muslim society today and added the names of such backward communities found 
 




among them in the list of Other Backward Classes”. Government of India (1955): Report of 
the Backward Classes Commission (Vol.1), p. 27. 
13 The mandate given to the committee broadly included: (a) to ‘obtain relevant information 
from departments/agencies of Central & State Governments and also conduct an intensive 
literature survey to identify published data, articles and research on relative social, economic 
and educational statistics of Muslims in India at the State, regional and district levels…’, (b) 
to ‘consolidate, collate and analyze  the above information/literature to identify areas of 
intervention by Government to address relevant issues relating to the social, economic and 
educational status of the Muslim community’. Also see, Notification No. 850/3/C/3/05 – Pol. 
Government of India, New Delhi.   
14 Report of National Commission on Religious and Linguistic Minorities (2007), 
Government of India, p. 153.  
15 Although there is no constitutional limit to quantum of reservation, successive rulings of 
the Supreme Court beginning with Balaji Vs State of Mysore (1963) fixed a ceiling of 50 
percent for all reservation taken together. 
16 For example, when the government of Andhra Pradesh announced a 5 per cent reservation 
for Muslims in the state in educational institutions and jobs in 2004, it raised political storms. 
The BJP described this reservation as ‘anti-national’ and announced to launch rigorous 
campaign against it. On July 18, Venkiah Naidu, a senior member of the BJP, told the 
reporters that ‘the decision of to give 5 per cent of reservation to Muslims in education and 
jobs is dangerous, divisive and against national interest.’  
17 For example, the Gujarat government refused to distribute scholarships initiated by 
Ministry of Minority Affairs to the minority students until the Gujarat High Court directed it 
to implement the scheme. Other BJP ruled states such as Chhattisgarh and Goa have also been 
reluctant to distribute scholarship to minority students,    
18 See Ministry of Textiles, Government of India (also see, 
http://texmin.nic.in/policy/policy_scheme.htmhttp://texmin.nic.in) 
19 Report of the Expert Group ‘Equal Opportunity Commission: What, Why and How?’ 
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